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Development and Decay of Extra-Linguistic Communication
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Cognitive Pragmatics theory is concerned with analyzing the cognitive processes
underlying communication. In previous works we have explained the emergence
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of communication in context, as revealed by very young children, and the communi-
cative deficits shown by closed head injury patients. The aim of the present work
is an extension of Cognitive Pragmatics to the emergence and the decay of extra-
linguistic communication. In particular, we investigate the performance of 2- to 7-
year-old children and that of Alzheimer’s patients in standard and nonstandard
(irony and deceit) pragmatic tasks. The predictions derived by Cognitive Pragmatics
are confirmed. Comprehension of pragmatic phenomena which are more complex
according to the theory emerges later in the development (Experiment 1), and their
decay is most severe in Alzheimer’s patients (Experiment 2). We conclude that the
framework provided by Cognitive Pragmatics can accommodate both the develop-
ment and the decay of extra-linguistic communication. © 2000 Academic Press
Introduction
Pragmatic competence is the ability to communicate in context. Within
the framework provided by Speech Act theory, Airenti, Bara, and Colombetti
(1993a) propose Cognitive Pragmatics theory, which is concerned with the
cognitive processes underlying human communication. The theory can ex-
plain differences in difficulty among different communicative acts in terms
of the complexity of the mental representations and the chain of inferences
involved.
In this paper we are concerned with both standard and nonstandard com-
munication, in particular, with irony and deceit (Airenti, Bara, & Colombetti,
1993b).
Cognitive Pragmatics
A major assumption of Cognitive Pragmatics theory is that a cognitive
analysis of dialogue should distinguish between its conversational and be-
havioral aspects. When one communicates, her aim is to achieve a certain
effect on a partner, namely, to change the partner’s mental states and possibly
to induce him to perform some action. The choice of a communicative way
to attain this goal provides her with the subsidiary goal to follow the rules
of conversation. Behavioral and conversational goals have completely inde-
pendent origins; thus, an agent’s behavior may be noncooperative, in spite
of his conversational cooperation:
Ann: Would you please type this letter for me?
Bernard: Sorry, but the director authorized me to go out now. (1)
Behavioral cooperation requires that the agents act on the basis of a plan
that is at least partially shared; we call this plan the behavior game of x and
y (Airenti, Bara, & Colombetti, 1984). The behavior game in (1) is:
[MAKE-A-FAVOR]
x asks y a favor
y makes x the favor (2)
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The actual actions performed by the agents realize the moves of the behav-
ior game they are playing. The meaning of a communicative action (either
linguistic or extra-linguistic, or usually a mix of the two) is fully understood
only when it is clear which move of the behavior game it realizes. Thus, we
will consider speech acts as moves of behavior games; conversely, each
move of a behavior game has a communicative value, and can therefore be
considered as a communicative act.
Bara and Bucciarelli (1998) carried out a study on the acquisition of prag-
matic competence by 2- to 7-year-old children. They confirm the predictions
of Cognitive Pragmatics: (i) standard communication is easier than nonstan-
dard communication, (ii) there exists a trend of difficulty where, from the
easiest to the most difficult, the comprehension tasks have the following
order: simple speech acts, complex speech acts, ironies, deceits.
Bara, Tirassa, and Zettin (1997) have also used a similar linguistic protocol
to test the predictions derived by the theory on closed head injuries patients.
The same trend of difficulty has been observed.
In order to extend our knowledge to nonverbal aspects of communication,
we devised an extra-linguistic protocol to test the theory both on young chil-
dren and on Alzheimer’s patients. A main consequence is that the predicted
trend of difficulty posits irony at a higher level of difficulty with respect to
deceit. In fact, ironies are based essentially on the linguistic code, and they
are heavily penalized by the absence of language. Along with the new trend
of difficulty, our aim was to confirm two further predictions: that the
comprehension of more complex phenomena according to Cognitive Prag-
matics should emerge later in the development, and that such comprehen-
sion should be the first one to decrease in case of decay of pragmatic perfor-
mance.
The pragmatic protocol involves the comprehension of three simple
speech acts presented in the wild. While the participants were introduced
into the experimental setting, the experimenter realized simple communica-
tive acts through gestures like handing a glass of water (offering water) or
a box of candies (offering candies). Then, the comprehension of a series of
communicative acts was tested with short video-typed fictions, three in each
of the following categories: simple acts, complex acts, deceits, and ironies.
Participants had to comprehend the communicative intention of an actor in
a fiction. An example of deceit is: two kids, A and B, are playing: A breaks
a vase on the table. A woman enters the room looking at the disaster, and
A points to B. An example of irony is: two girls, A and B, are sitting at a
table. B takes two chocolates from a box, and eats one of them. A touches
her shoulder, opening her hand in a gesture of request. But, B eats also the
second chocolate. A, with a smile, caresses B. The answers consisted in




Percentages of Correct Responses by Children in the Four Age Groups
in the Pragmatic Tasks
Pragmatic tasks
Simple
in the wild Simple Complex Deceits Ironies Overall
2;6–3 78 38 52 43 33 49
3;6–4 68 47 68 45 25 51
4;6–5;6 72 73 70 48 27 61
6–7 82 82 73 58 55 70
Overall 75 60 66 48 35 58
Experiment 1: Emergence of Extra-Linguistic Communication
Methods. Eighty children belonging to the following age groups partici-
pated in the experiment: 2;6–3, 3;6–4, 4;6–5;6, and 6–7 years. There were
20 subjects in each group with an equal number of boys and girls. The experi-
ment was conducted in a single session and lasted about 30 min. The order
of presentation of the pragmatic tasks was balanced according to age group
and gender of the subjects.
Results. Table 1 shows the percentages of correct responses by children
in the four age groups in the pragmatic tasks. Simple acts presented in the
wild are the easiest tasks to deal with, even easier than simple acts in fictions
(Wilcoxon test: z3112, p .002). As regards the pragmatic phenomena
investigated through fictions, standard communication is easier than nonstan-
dard communication (Wilcoxon test: z  5.29, p  .0001), and the pre-
dicted trend of difficulty among pragmatic tasks is confirmed (Page’s L test:
L  3895.5, p  .01).
Experiment 2: Decay of Extra-Linguistic Communication
Methods. Fourteen Alzheimer’s patients (according to NINCDS/ADRDA
criteria) and thirteen controls comparable for age and education took part in
the experiment. The age of the participants ranged from 60 to 80 years. They
were selected according to the severity of dementia assessed by the Global
Deterioration Scale (Reisberg et al. 1988): patients above the fourth level of
the scale were discarded as they were potentially unable to understand the
tasks.
The experiment was conducted in two sessions: one for the neuropsycho-
logical battery, and one for the pragmatic tasks. The neuropsychological bat-
tery included the global assessment of dementia (MODA: Brazzelli et al.
1994), the Block Design and Picture Arrangement subtests of the WAIS, and




Percentages of Correct Responses by Patients and Controls in the Pragmatic Tasks
Pragmatic tasks
Simple
in the wild Simple Complex Deceits Ironies Overall
Patients 79 79 64 52 19 59
Controls 95 95 95 77 59 84
Results. Table 2 shows the percentages of correct responses by Alzhei-
mer’s patients and controls in the pragmatic tasks. For patients, simple acts
in the wild were equivalent to simple acts in fictions. Further, as regards the
pragmatic phenomena investigated through fictions, standard communication
was easier than nonstandard communication (Wilcoxon test: z  2.94, p
 .003), and the predicted trend of difficulty among pragmatic tasks was
confirmed (Page’s L test: L  392.5, p  .00005).
The same pattern of results holds for the control group: simple acts in the
wild are as easy as simple acts in fictions, and standard communication is
easier than nonstandard communication (Wilcoxon test: z  2.83, p 
.005). Although not significant, the trend of difficulty among pragmatic tasks
is in the predicted direction.
Overall, the global performance of Alzheimer’s patients was poorer than
the performance of the controls (Mann-Whitney: z  3.81, p  .0001).
Also, patients performed worse than controls both in standard communica-
tion (Mann-Whitney test: z3.27, p .001), and in nonstandard commu-
nication (Mann-Whitney: z  3.3, p  .001).
The analytical results show that difference in performance between the
two groups is due to difference in performance in the most complex tasks.
In fact, patients did not differ from controls neither for simple acts in action
(Mann-Whitney: z1.62, p .10), nor for simple acts in fictions (Mann-
Whitney: z  1.04, p  .29). The two groups differ according to complex
acts, deceits and ironies (Mann-Whitney test: z value ranging from 2.43
to 2.93, p value ranging from .015 to.001). The results concerning the
neuropsychological test are in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Mean Scores by Patients and Controls in the Neuropsychological Tests
Neuropsychological tests
WAIS WAIS
Block Picture Phonemic Elithorn
MODA design arrangement Fluency Labyrinths
Patients 74.92 12.86 10 20.36 5.58
Controls 92.60 27.15 21.53 29.23 11.36
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Patients performed worse than controls in all the neuropsychological tests
(Mann-Whitney test: z ranging from 2.5 to 4.44, p value ranging from
.012 to  .0001). Only a few significant correlations were found between
performance in the neuropsychological tests and the pragmatic tasks. In the
patients’ group, Block design and simple acts (Fisher’s r .729, p .0034),
and Picture arrangement and deceits (Fisher’s r  .662, p  .0117); in the
control group, complex acts and Phonemic Fluency (Fisher’s r  .554, p 
.048), and ironies and Phonemic Fluency (Fisher’s r  .705, p  .0056).
Conclusion
The present work was based on an original extra-linguistic protocol that
we constructed in order to extend Cognitive Pragmatics’ predictions to extra-
linguistic communication. Experiment 1 represented the first systematic in-
vestigation in the emergence of extra-linguistic communication. Children ba-
sically follow the same path of the emergence of linguistic competence, with
the predicted inversion between irony and deceit. Regarding the decay con-
text, the inverse trend was found in Experiment 2. We outline that in Alzhei-
mer’s patients the decay in pragmatic tasks is not simply related to frontal
functions (planning and problem solving). The hypothesis is that pragmatic
competence is an autonomous domain of investigation in degenerative de-
mentia. Cognitive Pragmatics attempts to explain in terms of mental rep-
resentations and inferences the respective difficulty of different kinds of
communicative acts. In a diachronic perspective, we have investigated the
relations between complexity of pragmatic phenomena and their appearance,
development, and decay.
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Spatial Learning on the Morris Water Maze Test after a Short-Term
Paradoxical Sleep Deprivation in the Rat
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Universite´ de Montre´al
Twelve rats were deprived of paradoxical sleep (PS) for eight hours using the
small platform method. PS-deprived and control rats then learned either the stan-
dard allocentric version (using external cues) of the Morris Water Maze (MWM)
or a delayed alternation version (changing the platform location between trials:
MWMDA). Overall, rats learning the MWMDA made more quadrant entries than rats
learning the allocentric version. Compared to other rats, PS-deprived rats crossed
more quadrants only in the MWMDA. These results show that MWMDA is a more
complex task to learn and is more vulnerable to PS deprivation than allocentric
spatial orientation. Since delayed alternation is dependent upon frontal structures,
we propose that tasks involving the frontal cortex are more sensitive to short-term
PS deprivation than tasks related to hippocampal structures. © 2000 Academic Press
Introduction
Several studies have shown in humans and animals the existence of a
relationship between paradoxical sleep (PS) and cognition, particularly con-
cerning memory (Smith, 1985; 1995). While most of these studies demon-
strate the detrimental effect of PS deprivation on memory consolidation,
much fewer studies have analysed the effects of PS deprivation preceding
the acquisition of a new task in order to evaluate the preparatory nature of
PS on learning itself. The literature suggests that complex tasks are more
vulnerable to PS deprivation than simple tasks where the animal does not
have to manifest an important behavioral adaptation (Smith, 1985). In the
present study, we measured the effects of short-term PS deprivation on learn-
ing a simple and a complex version of the Morris Water Maze Test (MWM).
Methods
Thirty-six young male Sprague–Dawley rats (300–350 g) were divided
into three equal groups and submitted to one of three sleeping conditions
for eight hours, starting at the onset of the light period: 12 rats were PS
